Susan Burk Returns As U.S. Representative to the High Stakes 2010 NPT Review Conference

Summary: Obama has made it clear he sees the “sound” Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as critical to stemming nuclear weapons proliferation. So what will Obama’s bold nuclear moves-warming up to Russia on a new START treaty, calling for eventual nuclear weapons abolition, and bringing focus back to the NPT-yield? It’s too soon to tell. But the nomination Susan Burk as Special Representative reflects the high aims Obama has for the 2010 meeting. Below is a review of Burk’s testimony to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and discussion of NPT 2010 meeting’s significance to Obamaland foreign policy.

Two key-if little noted-nominees for diplomatic roles in the Obama White House testified before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday.  Ivo Daalder has been tapped for U.S. Representative on the NATO Council, and Sarah Burk has been nominated for U.S. Representative to the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.

President Obama’s recently announced commitment[i] to revitalizing the NPT to stem nuclear proliferation brings Burk’s likely role special significance.

Burk, if confirmed, will play a major role in the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Held every five years, these meetings bring together the 188 treaty members to discuss nonproliferation and disarmament issues. With Iran inching closer towards nuclear weapons capability and North Korea reneging on its pledge to disarm, this meeting may be the last chance to exert multinational pressure on these rogue states.

NPT meetings have had a erratic track record. In 1995, with Susan Burk heading up Clinton’s delegation, the NPT treaty was renewed permanently. But the 2000 conference was marked more by what was avoided (fears of collapse in the wake of 1998 nuclear tests of Pakistan and India), and 2005’s has been considered “a near total fiasco.”[ii]

Iran, as a member of the NPT, holds a unique test for the treaty regime. While Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea have developed nuclear weapons since the treaty’s ratification, none were members of the NPT (North Korea left the organization before developing its limited nuclear weapons capability). Iran crossing the nuclear line would represent the treaty’s largest failure-and call into question its grand bargain of nonproliferation in return for peaceful nuclear technology sharing and eventual nuclear weapons disarmament.

Susan Burk’s opening statement offers a concise review of the Obama administration nonproliferation policy aims and the challenges it faces as it heads into the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The administration has an ambitious agenda, calling for:

* Nuclear Fissile Material Cut-Off treaty

*  Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

*  Successor to the START treaty between Russia and United States

*  WMD Free-Zone in the Middle East

*  IAEA Nuclear Fuel Bank to spur peaceful uses of nuclear technology

Burk also states her intent to shepherd international support against potential Iran nuclear weapons proliferation and North Korea’s nuclear program:

The second pillar of the Treaty is nonproliferation. The United States, along with other NPT Parties, must act with urgency to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. We need tough and smart diplomacy – backed by real incentives and real pressures – to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon capability and to achieve the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

And on the NPT itself she stated:

If confirmed, I will work with colleagues in the State Department and elsewhere in the government, as well as other NPT stakeholders, to lay the groundwork for a 2010 Review Conference that will reinforce the Treaty as an effective legal and political barrier to nuclear proliferation.

Obama’s call for eventual nuclear abolition puts the NPT front and center. We will see if improved relations with Russia and Europe, not to mention Latin America and Asia, yield any rewards at this global conference. Past conferences have seen success and utter failure. If used effectively, the 2010 NPT conference could signal a unified voice against recent Iranian and North Korean nuclear policies. Furthermore, the diplomatic moves of other nations will determine whether or not an Iranian nuclear weapons capability sets off a nuclear-arms race throughout the Middle East.

While many external factors will shape results of the 2010 NPT Conference, the conference will be an early indicator on the effectiveness of President Obama’s foreign policy.

 

Related Materials

i On April 5th, 2009 President Barack Obama delivered an address on nuclear weapons in Czech Republic city of Prague. His speech highlighted the importance of the NPT:

Second, together we will strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a basis for cooperation.

The basic bargain is sound: Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy. To strengthen the treaty, we should embrace several principles. We need more resources and authority to strengthen international inspections. We need real and immediate consequences for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the treaty without cause.

…

But we go forward with no illusions. Some countries will break the rules. That’s why we need a structure in place that ensures when any nation does, they will face consequences.

Just this morning, we were reminded again of why we need a new and more rigorous approach to address this threat. North Korea broke the rules once again by testing a rocket that could be used for long range missiles. This provocation underscores the need for action — not just this afternoon at the U.N. Security Council, but in our determination to prevent the spread of these weapons.

Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something. The world must stand together to prevent the spread of these weapons. Now is the time for a strong international response — (applause) — now is the time for a strong international response, and North Korea must know that the path to security and respect will never come through threats and illegal weapons. All nations must come together to build a stronger, global regime. And that’s why we must stand shoulder to shoulder to pressure the North Koreans to change course.

ii Quinlan, Michael. Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects. Telegraph review article, April 23rd 2009:

The next NPT review conference, due in 2010, has a chance to redeem itself after what the author rightly calls the “near-total fiasco” of its predecessor four years ago. It could be a key step towards the eventual abolition of weapons whose “lethal enormity” has changed the nature of warfare. Quinlan writes that few informed commentators would put at more than 50-50 the chances of reaching that goal by 2045, the centenary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The road ahead will be long, difficult and uncertain.

Torturing Over Torture in Obamaland: What The Pundits Are Missing; The Zelikow Memo

Summary: Members of the Obama administration and the DC punditry should read Philip Zelikow’s recent blog at Foreign Policy magazine. He reminds us that the question over torture isn’t whether Obamaland botched its handling or the effectiveness of the interrogation techniques, but the morality and consequences of prusuing a policy torture. This is not to suggest morality of the day should override laws, but rather when pursuing a policy it may be sometimes best to ask ‘ought we be doing this?’ before asking ‘how can we do this?’. Sometimes seeking out covert justifications for a decision open more troublesome dillemas.

It’s been a tough week for the Obama administration. Pundits have almost universally failing marks to Obamaland’s handling of the torture issue. Either he’s being too soft (not going after the interrogators and failing to fess up to the intelligence gained by Bush era enhanced interrogation techniques) or he’s being too hard (chasing after lawyers who were doing what they could to defend American security).

And the pundits don’t stop there. How President Barack Obama aired the issue has brought stiff rebukes. Only releasing some memos has opened the White House to charges that it’s cherry picking. And it hasn’t helped that in a draft memo CIA Director Dennis Blair admitted enhanced interrogation techniques worked, only to have it deleted upon official release.

So not only are the wing-nuts on both sides unhappy, the press has caught the White House not being transparent on a tier-one issue—analogous to catching a teenager with their pants down at the school dance.

Now none of this is surprising: the torture issue is thorny, and there was no ‘perfect’ solution for Obama come to. This becomes painfully obvious when one sees conservatives (read Dick Cheney) sensing the torture issue as the wedge issue to revitalize Republican Party (particularly if there is another terrorist attack on America or its allies).

Listening on torture: Philip Zelikow's recent Foreign Policy article offers some valuable, if indirect, advice to the administration. Before deciding on how to deal with torture, we must first analyze the moral and practical consequences to permitting enhanced interrogation techniques. In calling for a moral analysis of torture, Zelikow implicitly highlights the value of frank and open discussion. While Americans know Obama is against torture, it might be worth reminding them why.

But this all overlooks a basic point: yes, torture can work. But does that mean only torture works, and how is American society impacted by water-boarding terrorists? By bypassing this valuable discussion (or simply trying to recycle news-cycles), the media has flooded the public with talking points & juvenile discussions over who’s up & who’s down.

Absent in this high-minded prattle has been serious analysis of this vital moral and national security issue.

And that is why Philip Zelikow’s recent blog entry on Foreign Policy is so important. There Zelikow reveals his authorship of a dissenting memo towards the Bush administration’s legal reasoning on enhanced interrogation techniques. Boilded down he brings these crucial points to the debate over torture:

1)      Water-boarding misses the point: “Before getting to water-boarding, the captive had already been stripped naked, shackled to ceiling chains keeping him standing so he cannot fall asleep for extended periods, hosed periodically with cold water, slapped around, jammed into boxes, etc. etc. Sleep deprivation is most important.” 

2)      The CIA techniques being used were “proscribed by current case-law” (i.e. illegal) 

3)      In legally justifying their policies the Bush White House did not claim a right only to torture non-citizen terrorists, but had to argue that US citizens could be tortured with compelling national security concerns. Or as he states much more brutally, “Americans in any town of this country could constitutionally be hung from the ceiling naked, sleep deprived, water-boarded, and all the rest — if the alleged national security justification was compelling.” 

4)      Upon distrubing his memo, Zelikow soon discovered that the White House attempted to gather and destroy all copies

Zelikow shows exactly how America got into this torture mess—by the Bush administration actively avoiding a moral discussion over the role of torture in national security, and instead giving life to truly dangerous legal interpretations. As such he reminds us that the discussion over whether or not truly dangerous terrorists cannot be separated from the larger question torture in American society.

The Bush administration, for reasons of national security, did a profound disservice by avoiding a frank discussion on torture. When weighing that against Obama’s decision to curtail torture and messy delivery, recent Obama administration criticisms come across toothless and swallow.

But Zelikow—who’s “rough guess is that physical coercion can break people faster, with some tradeoff in degraded and less reliable results”—demands we bring the discussion back to morality. By avoiding this discussion the Bush administration pushed covert and pernicious legal justifications whose reverberations may have done caused more problems that they solved.

The lesson for Obamaland? Have the discussion. Hold a presidential press conference.

Update 5:12 pm: Next Wedneday–coincidently his 100th day in office–Barack Obama will hold his third presidential press conference.

Blog-on-Blog: About Jeffrey Goldberg Blog Bashing Roger Cohen

Summary: Let’s move on from debates over the character of the Iranian regime; it gets us no closer to the real questions: 1) how best to deter Iran from going nuclear and 2) if Iran develops nuclear weapons, how best to prevent catastrophe.

Yesterday Jeffrey Goldberg dedicated his Atlantic blog entry to exposing NYTimes columnist Roger Cohen’s shallow conception of the Iranian threat faced by Israel. You can read/watch the ‘Cohen evisceration’ here in full, but here’s boiled down version:

-Roger Cohen debated Rabbi David Wolpe; the topic: Iran and Israel

-Wolpe insists Cohen imagine a time when the balance of power between Iran and Israel flips: meaning when Iran has nuclear weapons/equal or greater conventional military capabilities. Add to this that Hamas and Hezbollah are Iran proxies, and thus would reap direct benefits from such strategic flip.

-Cohen waffles—says some things about stopping Iran from getting The Bomb. Audience laughs.

The problems with this semantic takedown (even if Contentions gives it kudos):

A.      Iran gaining non-nuclear parity with Israel

While Israeli armed forces are more sophisticated, Iran could already damage Israel with a combo-punch of ballistic missiles and, yes, funded terrorist attacks on Israel 

Why hasn’t this happened?

The Israeli nuclear shield: If Iran ever made such a unilateral move, the regime would be over. 

B.      But what if Iran gets The Bomb? 

The counter to the Goldberg/Wolpe point: couldn’t a nuclear Iran and nuclear Israel follow general deterrence theory? 

Yes, one could believe that Iran really wants to destroy Israel no matter the price—even if the price is the destruction of Iran itself. But if such a fanatical approach was true, why wouldn’t Iran do it now? Heck, even if they just try to get Israel to launch enough nuclear weapons—the after-effects of the attack could do the trick. 

C.      Defensive Reasons for an Iranian nuclear weapons program

Not unlike Russia responding to the American nuke, China responding to nuclear bullying, or Pakistan reacting to the India’s nuclear acquisition, there are rational and defensive reasons for Tehran to seek The Bomb. Israel is a nuclear-weapons state, and the Iranian regime has learned (thanks to Iraq) that actually having weapons is the best defense from regime change. And, yes, on top of that a nuclear Tehran would most likely become the hegemon of the Arab world. 

These benefits go away if Tehran either attacks Israel, or hands off a nuclear suitcase to Hamas. If India and Pakistan could stop themselves from pressing the button, Iran and Israel can do the same. 

D.      Reasons to Fear a Nuclear-Armed Iran/What We Should Be Talking About 

I am not fan of a nuclear-armed Iran. The current Iranian regime is an unstable, autocratic and exceeding dangerous one. 

But my concerns over a nuclear-armed Iran are as follows: 

- It could lead to a massive nuclear build-up between Israel and Iran

-plunge the Middle East into a nuclear proliferating arms race

-result: greatly increase the likelihood of a nuclear accident or nuclear misread 

These are the reasons to fear a nuclear-armed Iran, not the Wolpe/Goldberg thesis. And if they really want to find a problem with Cohen’s position, they should read Daniel Drenzer’s blog at FP. 

the real debate isn’t over the attitude of the Iranian regime (a murky, passionate and—at heart—subjective debate), but how to effectively deter Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. And how best to prepare the global community for an Iranian nuke would be a good backup discussion. 

Document: Smith Simpson ‘State Magazine’ Article

Smith Simpson on Diplomacy

By Carl Goodman 

(PDF version can be found here)

It is a fine spring day in the land of Jefferson, and the patio seems an appropriate enough setting to talk about diplomacy. The person talking, Smith Simpson, 92, has been concerned about the state of diplomacy during much of this century and remains concerned about its health in the next. 

At an age when most people are preoccupied with the state of their own health, Mr. Simpson speaks softly yet firmly of his long-standing interest in diplomacy and Americans’ need to better understand it. He is still inspired by the nation’s first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, whose home is just across the Rivanna Valley from the hillside bungalow Mr. Simpson has shared with his wife since their move from Northern Virginia to Charlottesville, Va., in 1992. 

He made his personal commitment to diplomacy in his teens. After laying a wreath on an ancestor’s grave in Arlington National Cemetery, he studied the hundreds of tombstones attesting to lives shattered by war. World War I, in fact, was still raging in Europe, and there would be many more tombstones. He vowed then to work toward international understanding, good will and peace. 

That opportunity came a quarter century later. After graduating from the University of Virginia, where he took the one pioneering course in international relations, he headed north to study law-primarily to gain access to politics. But by the time he graduated from Cornell Law School and took the Virginia bar exam, he concluded that he and the law were not suited for a lifetime relationship. Fortunately, a fellowship from Columbia University enabled him to pursue full-time studies in international relations, organizations and law. 

He spent the summer of 1933, at the dawn of Roosevelt’s New Deal, in Geneva. While there, he fell for a strikingly beautiful secretary, Henriette Lannie, at the International Labor Organization, and it wasn’t long before he proposed marriage. She accepted his proposal. 

 From Geneva, he reported to Washington, D.C., as a labor adviser for the National Recovery Administration. Soon afterwards, the asphalt shingle and roofing industry lured him to New York to help administer its fair competition code. With his NRA experience, he admitted giving “the industry a hard time because I felt it was getting entirely too close to what the anti-trust laws prohibited.” 

Meanwhile, he began to worry about whether his fiancée could be happy in so noisy a city, after quiet, lakebound Geneva, her hometown. He suggested she first visit New York and possibly get a job there to see how she liked it. She replied, “I am not marrying New York. I’m marrying you.” As a testament to this, they will celebrate their 65th wedding anniversary this November in Williamsburg, Va., with their two daughters, three granddaughters and two great-granddaughters. 

The Supreme Court’s decision that the National Industrial Recovery Act was unconstitutional cut short the Simpsons’ stay in New York. When he was offered an appointment at the University of Pennsylvania, they moved to Philadelphia, and he was soon advising that state’s government on unemployment and co-authoring its first unemployment compensation act.

 The day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the War Shipping Administration called. Labor problems were delaying convoys, and Mr. Simpson’s help was needed. Later, when the State Department began drafting postwar labor and social questions for a United Nations Charter, State pried him loose from War Shipping to conduct the necessary studies. 

When the Dumbarton Oaks Conference approved the U.S. draft of a U.N. charter, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles authorized the creation of a Division of Labor Relations in the Department and a labor attaché program in the Foreign Service Auxiliary. Enlisted to help organize the division, Mr. Simpson became chief of its International Labor Organizations branch. 

The new category of labor attaché was in for some “rocky” times in the embassies. Boasted one veteran Foreign Service officer: “I’ve never met a Socialist (read ‘labor leader’) and I never expect to.” There was no one with Foreign Service experience in the new labor division. Convinced that the experience was necessary, Mr. Simpson volunteered as a pioneer labor attaché to Brussels. Reluctant to lose someone familiar with international labor problems, the division head agreed on the condition that he return after a tour of two years. The two years lasted 18. 

He joined the Foreign Service, serving both in embassies and, at his request, in consular posts, large and small, as first secretary in Athens and Mexico City, as deputy principal officer in Bombay and as consul general in Mozambique. After a detail to the labor Department and a stint on the Board of Examiners, Mr. Simpson retired to wage a public campaign for instruction in diplomacy on the college-university level and then, hopefully, to move it into secondary and even primary schools. 

 His first book was in the proofreading stage when William J. Crockett, State’s deputy under secretary for Administration, invited him to lunch. He had been reading some of Mr. Simpson’s articles in the Foreign Service Journal and The Nation. He considered them “on the beam,” and he wanted someone with Foreign Service experience to invigorate what he was trying to do. 

So back to State Mr. Simpson went-this time as a contractor. When the year ended, his book, “Anatomy of the State Department,” was published, and he returned to his campaign on diplomacy, insisting, as he had in his book, that “Diplomacy is our principal alternative to war. Upon it and its quality rest the lives of all of us.” 

Besides organizing conferences on the study of diplomacy at the Wharton School and the University of Virginia, Mr. Simpson taught a one-semester course on Diplomacy at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, satisfying longtime dean Peter Krogh that diplomacy could indeed be taught. Instruction at Georgetown followed. Mr. Simpson also organized an Institute for the Study of Diplomacy there to generate materials needed for instructional purposes and distribution to the public. Then followed a Centre for the Study of Diplomacy at the U.K. University of Leicester, England, adding an international dimension to his campaign. 

Dean Krogh, who stepped down as dean but still teaches, has praised the retired “scholar-diplomat” for being “indefatigable” in trying to popularize diplomacy. 

More than anything, Mr. Simpson would like to see a Thomas Jefferson Center for the Study of Diplomacy established at the university Jefferson founded. “How appropriate a memorial it would be to an early diplomat of the country and, arguably, the first modern one,” he mused. 

There is no better view than the one of Monticello when the sun’s angle is just right. It is his hope that diplomacy, too, will have its day in the sun.

(reproduction of State Maganize, Oct. 1999 article-a publication of the United States Department of State)

Executive Summary– The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding worst-case outcomes

(reproduced from summary’s original PDF format)

Avoiding worst-case outcomes, Mark Fitzpatrick, Director of the IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, notes that during 2009, Iran will probably reach the point at which it has produced enough low-enriched uranium to make a nuclear bomb – though it would first have to enrich it further. This will increasingly raise the
question of whether military action is needed in the absence of progress in diplomacy. However, the introduction of the Adelphi Paper argues that the question of ‘Iran with the bomb or a bombed Iran’ is a false dichotomy, because bombing Iran would probably do more to spur than to delay the country’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. In the aftermath of an unprovoked attack, Iran could be expected to withdraw from the NPT and engage the full resources of a unified nation in a determined nuclear-weapons development programme.

In framing the issue, Chapter One describes Iran’s pursuit of uranium enrichment and plutonium production facilities and concludes that its purpose is to acquire a weapons capability. Evidence for this purpose is to be found in the secrecy and deception behind the programme, the military connections and evidence of weapons development work, and the economic illogic of investing in these sensitive technologies without having any power plants that can use the enriched uranium.

Chapter Two assesses Western strategy to date, starting with the denial of supply policy tools employed for two decades and the more recent ‘demand-side’ strategies employing both sanctions and incentives. The strategies have failed in the past five years to stop Iran but this does not mean Iran is ‘winning.’ The outcome so far can best be characterized as ‘lose-lose.’

Chapter Three analyzes options for trying to keep Iran’s programme non-weaponised. Although the distinction is blurred in Iran’s case, being able to enrich uranium is not equivalent to having a nuclear weapon. The trick is how to build barriers between a latent Iranian nuclear weapons capability and actual weapons production. Recognizing the reality that Iran has such a latent capability need not mean accepting Iranian enrichment as legitimate. Iran’s uranium enrichment activity in defiance of five Security Council resolutions puts the nation in continuous breach of international law.

Assuming that Iran has not given up its weapons purpose, the paper assesses that Iran would not accept any limitations that would impede it from achieving a weapons capability. The problem can only be solved if Iran makes a strategic decision not to seek a nuclear weapons capability. Based on Iran’s past diplomacy, it can be expected to neither accept nor reject proposed restrictions, but rather to shunt them aside through non-responsive counter-proposals and endless negotiation and filibuster. Meanwhile, if the Security Council were to take a fallback position that accepted enrichment in Iran, doing so would incur the immediate cost of establishing a new negotiation benchmark.

The Adelphi Paper assesses various fallback options that have been offered for legalizing Iran’s enrichment in exchange for intrusive inspections and constraints on the programme. In theory, the concept of a multinational enrichment facility on Iranian soil may be the ‘least bad’ option, but in practice it is infeasible and would increase the net proliferation risk. On one hand, the risks of diversion and clandestine operations would be lowered by options that increased international knowledge about Iran’s nuclear programmes. But if this meant legalizing Iran’s programme, the result would be greater access to foreign technology and thereby an increased risk if Iran withdrew from the NPT. Legitimising enrichment in Iran would also contribute to the risk of a regional proliferation cascade by stimulating interest in enrichment elsewhere in the region.

Fitzpatrick concludes that the risks are best minimised by reinforcing the options presented to Iran of cooperation or isolation. If Iran continues to defy the Security Council, its enrichment programme can be constrained and delayed by export controls, sanctions, financial pressure, interdiction and other means of exploiting Iran’s vulnerabilities.

The West, in particular the United States, should seek to engage Iran. If Tehran shows a willingness to negotiate, incentives can be tabled, including ways to address Iran’s security concerns through an inclusive regional security structure.

In the likely event that Iran does acquire a latent nuclear-weapons capability, containment and deterrence strategies will be critical to keeping Iran from crossing the line to weapons production. Deterrence policies were employed effectively during the Cold War against far more powerful opponents, and there is reason to believe that such policies would be effective in forestalling the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran. A dual policy of engagement and sanctions, with containment strategies targeted at limiting Iranian access to sensitive technologies and materials, is still the best way to test possibilities for Iranian cooperation while maintaining vigilance and controls to limit the nuclear-proliferation threat.

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Blog-On-Blog– The Ties that Bind, And the Ties That Don’t: US-India Nuclear Deal

(continued from this previous Proliferation Press posting)

For example, the United States supported the Pakistani regime. One of the requirements of the support was certification that Pakistan was not engaged in nuclear activity. But successive American Presidents—Reagan, Bush I and Clinton—all turned a blind eye to worrisome intelligence because of the immense strategic value of the US-Pakistan relationship. (For an excellent account of American policy towards Pakistan in respect to the nuclear question, read Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark’s book Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons)

End result: Pakistan ended up with nuclear weapons, and still held onto American miliary aid.

Furthermore, if the United States were firmly committed to ensuring the Indian nuclear stock-pile was neither modernized nor increased, it would require IAEA inspections of Indian military and civilian nuclear facilities. Yet, the US-India deal now only calls for civilian nuclear facility inspections—making India’s nuclear weapon program rather opaque to international eyes.

In short, rarely have proliferation concerns determined US foreign policy—especially in the case of the US-India nuclear deal.

Now there’s a simple argument in favor of the US-India nuclear deal. Until recently, India—with Pakistan, North Korea and Israel—occupy a nebulous zone in global politics: known, but unrecognized nuclear powers. Bringing India into the nuclear fold—by allowing it to enter nuclear fuel and technology deals with other recognized nuclear powers—patched a hole in the global system.

Yes, the US-India nuclear deal allows India to make nuclear deals with other countries as well—like Russia.

But it did so by a country-specific, not policy-specific manner. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) requires all nations to foreswear nuclear weapon development in return for technological and energy assistance from recognized nuclear powers. By letting a nuclear rogue like India—who never signed the treaty, and illegally manufactured nuclear weapons—get the keys to the nuclear candy store without offering similar treatment to other nations, one might wonder what message this sends to other countries: whether they be North Korea, Pakistan or Iran.

But proponents of the deal 1) recognized the difficulties of creating an issue-specific mechanism to bring in all troublesome nuclear nations and 2) argued the benefits—a alliance with India—would outweigh the risks.

But did America make India a steadfast ally—on par with Great Britain or Japan—from the nuclear deal? No. Rather the Bush administration made a high-stakes gambit, pegging that this status-granting agreement—tied with the nations’ liberal regimes—would better position America in a world facing a resurgent Russia and muscular China.

But the deal in no way forced India to carry the American line on China, Russia or even Iran. Any notion, as Maleki suggests, that India is the critical player in the Iranian nuclear crisis is short-sighted. Yes, gaining Indian to abstain on an IAEA vote did carry some weight. But the real obstacles to a de-nuclearized Iran are Russia and China, not India. (And there’s a considerable difference between India abstaining on a vote, than India actively lobbying for action against Iran’s nuclear program)

America and India are partners, just as Russia and India are partners. Where these relationships will go in the next years may heavily impact the global order. But any suggestion that the US-India nuclear deal 1) ties India’s hands in regards to their nuclear program or 2) instantly resulted in a new and defining alliance boldly thin contentions to make.  

Japanese Nuclear Flare Up Running Only On Fumes? Removed Air Force Chief Defends Revisionist Wartime History Views & Calls for Nuclear Weapon Debate

(continued from this Proliferation Press posting)

Bloomberg News reports on Tamogami’s call for a nuclear weapons debate in Japan:

“I think there should be debate about this, because nuclear deterrence would be enhanced as a result,” Toshio Tamogami, former head of the Air Defense Force, told reporters today at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan in Tokyo. Japan, which is bound by a post-war pacifist constitution drafted by the U.S., is a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso was forced to distance himself from Tamogami after the general published an essay that said Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek drew Japan into war with China. The essay drew condemnation from China and Tamogami was dismissed on Oct. 31.

A 2006 Christian Science Monitor report suggests the nuclear option isn’t on the table for Japan, but that Tamogami’s comments reflect a genuine desire among some Japanese officials to flex their nation’s military might:

“There is no way that the public would condone a nuclear weapons program,” says Michiko Kuga, a nonproliferation expert at the Japanese Defense Agency.

In order to acquire nuclear weapons, Japan would have to violate or withdraw from a number of international agreements, including the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Such a move would isolate Tokyo and ruin its chances for permanent membership in the UN Security Council, a long cherished goal.

Aside from undermining the continued extension of the US nuclear umbrella, Tokyo would certainly offend the sensibilities of its neighbors. North Korea already views Japan as a vassal of the US, and urged over the weekend that Tokyo be left out of the six-party talks on the grounds that the Abe administration are “political imbeciles,” incapable of recognizing the North as a nuclear state.

With neighbors like these, Japan perhaps has good reason to discuss a broader range of military options. The next step may be a revision of the nation’s Constitution, which prohibits the use of force. Abe wants to enact a new national charter within five years that has a more realistic approach to security matters.

A Nov. 2008 IPSNews report suggests Japan suggests a “middle power” path for Japan, with nationalistic calls for nuclear weapons & revisions to Japan’s military constraints unlikely to be enacted:

WASHINGTON, Nov 24 (IPS) – Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is nose-diving in the polls, its gaffe-prone prime minister Taro Aso has acquired a reputation as his party’s funeral director, and a pivotal election may transform the Japanese political landscape before September.

Particularly at stake is the country’s military and foreign policy. Currently, Japan is caught between its “peace constitution” and a much more assertive military policy envisioned by the conservative wing of the LDP. 

With the country dealing with economic decline and political uncertainty, some scholars are trying to find another way for Japan to relate to the world. Yoshihide Soeya, a professor of political science at Keio University and a member of several government councils, has been one of the leading proponents of a middle way for Japan. 

Speaking at a seminar in Washington, DC on Nov. 20, sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Soeya outlined his vision of Japan as a middle power staking out terrain between the great powers of the United States and China. 

Central to his argument is the assertion that Japan itself is not and does not want to be a great power. The country’s constitution and its alliance with the United States — which Soeya argued had not changed in the last half century and would not likely change in the near future — constrained such ambitions, even if they sometimes crop up on the popular debate. 

“Particularly in the domain of traditional security, where the military plays an important role, Japan’s role has not been that of a great power,” Soeya maintained. “And there is nothing to suggest that Japan is moving in that direction. Some discourses in Japan might give you the impression that that is happening. But it is not taking place at the policy level.” 

To illustrate this point, Soeya identified elements of middle-power diplomacy in Japan’s postwar policy. It provided economic assistance to Southeast Asia and China. It emphasized the concept of human security, which expands traditional definitions of security to include human needs such as food and shelter. And it labored long and hard within multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. 

…

“There is an increasing argument calling for the right of collective self-defense as part of Japanese security policy,” Soeya noted. “But the extent to which this is part of a larger strategic debate is questionable. There have been maybe public opinion makers, but not political actors, who have argued for the right of collective self-defense.’’ 

‘’Simultaneously they have talked about what the future would look like if Japan had that right,’’ Soeya said. ‘’For me, that would mean Japan fighting an American war, just as other middle powers like Australia and South Korea have fought America’s wars.” 

But that, Soeya continued, would be a step Japan would have to take. Becoming a middle power, in his conception, would require constitutional revision. “Without changing Article 9,” he argued, “Japan can’t become a full-fledged middle power. It can’t become part of peacekeeping or multilateral forces like Canadian forces in Afghanistan.” 

But Soeya was skeptical that such a change was in the works. “Japan has to start thinking about a post-revision strategy,” he concluded. “At that point, Japan will become a country that can fight in an American war. But I really doubt whether the Japanese public is ready for that.” 

Dealing with North Korea: The Case for the Kaesong Industrial Complex

by K. Edmund White

Does the solution to menacing North Korean regime rest in a North Korean industrial complex?

No. But a large part of that solution just might.

The Kaesong Industrial Facility represents a joint North and South Korean business venture. Here’s a good, if slightly out-of-date, description of the site:

The KIC opened in June 2004 under a contract between North Korea and South Korea’s Hyundai Asan Corporation and South Korea’s state-owned Korea Land Corporation. The complex is located between the North Korean city of Kaesong and the western border between the two Koreas. The workers produce goods mostly for the South Korean market, including watches, shoes, clothes, kitchenware, plastic containers, electrical cords and car parts, among other items. As of August, more than 8,000 [note: now closer to 13,000] North Korean workers were employed by 13 South Korean companies.

In essence it’s a grand bargain. North Korea gets tax revenue it desperately needs to survive. Meanwhile, South Korea gets cheap labor that speaks the same language. And both sides can push it as proof-positive of the natural connection between the two Koreas.

But this site may also play a role within the Korean nuclear crisis. It may serve, in the short term, as a carrot (that can be dangled) to force North Korea to give up their WMD program.

And, in the long term, it could yield the following outcomes:

1) The Kaesong Complex, reflecting South Korean economic standards, will show North Koreans first-hand the backwardness of their economic system

2) Any eventual reunification plan—which could see America lose influence in Korea—will come at a steep price: the disparity between the two Koreas is extreme. But joint ventures such as Kaesong can, if properly implemented, help dull the profound economic divide between North and South.

Making Kaesong a sucess reflects good policy and reaffirms America’s message to the world: dovetailing economic and political freedom (i.e. free market, liberal governing principles) not only reflect a more humane belief system, but provide all peoples greater material rewards.

Charles Pritchard, author of Failed Diplomacy, worked the North Korea problem in both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations—as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and as U.S. Ambassador and special envoy for negotiations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, respectively. We discussed Kaesong, and the Bush administration’s refusal to view these products as South Korean (thereby making them less marketable):

Pritchard: It’s a paradox. Even if the Bush administration desired the downfall of North Korea, if that were policy of the President, and he really wanted to see that, then he should then tell the South Koreans to make Kaesong bigger, better, faster now. Hire many more North Koreans. Have 100,000 workers there. Because the more North Koreans are exposed to work conditions and state of the art equipment—the welfare, the food, all of that stuff in stark contrast to what they have in North Korea—the faster there will be a public unease about the nature of their own regime.

That’s the silliness of the Bush administration. They ought to be promoting Kaesong even if they don’t like the regime, for those very reasons. And if you want to enhance US-South Korea relationship, you ought to be promoting joint ventures between the Koreas.

And in the long-term, providing larger-scale opportunities for North Koreans to see the benefits of something that’s close to market economy is a minimum to reinforcing the economic reforms of July 2002. That reform has since gone sputtering along. So Kaesong, from a negative and positive view, is a good deal and we’re just no making enough out of it.” (June 8^th interview)

But critics of Kaesong point to troublesome workers’ rights record. From a October 2006 Human Rights Watch article:

Human Rights Watch also found that South Korean companies are violating the existing KIC Labor Law, which stipulates that employers should pay workers directly in cash. An employers’ representative told Human Rights Watch that the South Korean companies have been asked instead to pay workers’ wages in U.S. dollars directly to the North Korean government, which in turn pays the workers in North Korean won after deducting a mandatory 30 percent contribution to a social welfare fund.

“The fact that North Korea has already managed to get South Korean companies to violate worker’s rights on wage payments is not only an embarrassment, but also raises concerns about other violations at Kaesong,” said Richardson.

“contentions” Iraq Chapters Boiled Down

 

A summary of a discussion on Iraq by two experts, falling near on squarely on the neo-converstation position.

Taken from contentions, the blog-companion of Commentary.

 

Max Boot
 

“The real challenge will be to make any decrease in violence sustainable in the long term—especially if we don’t have the political will to keep tens of thousands of U.S. troops in Baghdad for decades to come. Our only chance is to commit more resources to building up the Iraqi army (the police are a hopeless cause at the moment). But the likelihood is that the Iraqi Security Forces will come apart if we start to draw down our troops—as a majority of Congress seems to be pining for.” 

“Lebanon is on the verge of a civil war (as is the Palestinian Authority) and Iraq is already in the early stages of its own civil war.” 

“If I were to make a movie about the Middle East today it would have to be called Grim and Grimmer—and it would be a tragedy, not a farce.”

Victor Davis Hanson

“But if we change our way of doing business tactically, operationally, and psychologically—stop the arrest-and-release insanity, eliminate key militia leaders and disband their followers, expand the rules of engagement, accelerate cash payments for salaried Iraqis, patrol the borders, all while maintaining the veneer of Iraqi autonomy—even at this 11th hour we could entice the proverbial bystanders (a majority of the country) to cast their lot with the perceived winners: namely, us.” 

“So in fine American fashion (consider Grant and Sherman’s onus of turning the tide of the Civil War in 1864, or the assumption that Ridgeway was to save post-Yalu Korea), our national subconscious has decreed: ‘OK, General Petraeus. Preserve Iraqi democracy and don’t lose any more Americans in the process. You have less than a year. By the way: we’ll be passing hourly televised judgment on your progress!’” 

“So where does that leave us? In a race of sorts. On the one side, the Democrats realize that anger over the perceived stasis in Iraq has brought them the Congress and possibly the White House in 2008. On the other side, the administration’s personnel changes, the surge, and a belated public-relations counteroffensive have bought six months to a year (at most) to secure and quiet Baghdad.”

What Is Congress’s Wartime Role? Viewing 2002 Iraq Resolution

Did the United States Congress, in authorizing President George W. Bush to decide when to use force in Iraq, forfeit its wartime constitutional responsibity?

For Louis Fisher the answer is easy: Congress relinquished its balancing role to the President in the run up to the Iraq War. Fisher, in criticizing the executive’s portrayal of Iraq’s threat to the United States, argues that Congress had two options: Congress could have waited until after the election as they did with the Persian Gulf War or follow the Vietnam experience: escape any electoral damage by quickly giving in to President primacy.

Julian Zeilzer and Keith Whittington offer meaningful historical perspectives the fateful events of 2002. Zeilzer illustrates the lame legacies of Congress of the post-WWII era: 1) increasing partisanship, 2) the failure of Congress to achieve equity with the executive branch in regards to media coverage and 3) its historic deferral to the President on national security after WWII.

Whittington paints the historical picture more deeply in regards to war powers: showing Congress’s failure throughout the post-WWII era to offer a credible alternative to the executive’s leadership in wartime powers, national security, and intelligence.

Given this historical context, Congress clearly did not relinquish its constitutional responsibilities by giving the President the authority to launch the 2002 Iraqi. Instead this decision follows a half-century historical trend in our nation’s constitutional development: in which the needs of a hegemonic American nation (i.e. to manage ever growing and global security concerns) have eroded the traditional war powers balance between the executive and legislative branches.

Louis Fisher (review of his recent book) makes two reinforcing arguments: 1) the threat posed by Iraq, as presented by the administration, was overblown and politicized and 2) that Congress failed exercise its Constitutional duties and have their deliberation lead to a more informed debate. Fisher explains this failure through a botched political strategy: the Democratic leadership’s embrace of Bush’s request for authority over Iraq before a midterm election. For Fisher there stood an alternative strategy: Daschle could have delayed action until after the election and then held substantive discussion on the merits of engaging in preemptive action in Iraq. Fisher points to low public support for a war with Iraq to prove that that both options were feasible strategies. This representation of the public will, while clearly fails to highlight another feature of the public’s attitude toward the President: 75% approval of his handling of terrorism and 60% approval of his handling the nation’s affairs.[1] Suddenly the context of Daschle’s actions changes: instead of ignoring the public will, Daschle is facing political negotiations with a President with profound political support in the wake of the 9-11 attacks. The Iraq debate was not in a vacuum; it occurred within the context of the overall ‘war on terror’. In light of this, it seems that Fischer’s analysis would have done well to explore the ramifications of the Congress’s resolution three days after 9-11 allowing the President the following authority:

…use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on Sept. 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.[2]

While Americans showed restraint in their willingness to go to war with Iraq, they still expressed faith in its chief proponent: the President of the United States. Such public faith lent legitimacy to both the Iraq resolution and its precursor that gave the executive an expanded role in making military decisions during the ‘war on terror’. It seems Fisher’s two options were not as equally viable as he would wish one to believe.

Why did the public hold such a strong view of executive authority? Julian Zelizer (press clip), in documenting Congressional reform, points both to military history and legislative developments that have reinforced Congress’s diminished role in making military decisions. Zelizer points out that since WWII the Congress has not declared war—whether in the large operations witnessed in Korea or Vietnam, or the more modest operations carried out in Kosovo. This historical trend has followed both a change in the role of media and Congress. Zelizer’s overall project is to show how the shift from the committee system to the contemporary era has brought a mixed result: making it more open and decentralized, but at the same time making it more partisan and less trusted. Yet, one of the interesting wrinkles in this story is the failure of Congress to obtain a “legislative right to respond to the president (Zelizer 106).” In failing to act during a reformatory window, Zelizer shows how the door shut on Congress having an equal right to address the nation. In documenting this story, Zelizer shows the double-edged sword of television on Congress: while access gave Congressmen the ability to reach the public, Congress never was given the same preferential treatment as the executive branch. In 2002 Daschle not only faced a legislative precedent for the President’s authority in the war on terror, but faced a half-century of history that saw a popular President able to connect with the American public in a way Congress could not.

Had Congress achieved the ability to speak to the nation and maintained its bipartisan roots would there have been a different result in 2002? Perhaps. While Zelizer points to Congress’s low public support throughout the twentieth century, increased trust among politicians and the practical ability to talk back to the President would at the least allow Congress to reveal weaknesses in a President’s case for war. Accepting Fisher’s analysis of the weak foundations of the President’s case against Iraq, it seems that Daschle would at least have more tools to respond to Bush’s portrayal of the Iraqi threat.

Whittington (more on his research) offers a deeper historical reading into the constitutional constructions of the following constitutional overlaps between Congress and the President: the budget, war powers, and accountability in intelligence. In exploring war powers, Whittington uses the War Powers Resolution to tease out the relationship between the Congress and the President. Congress did make impressive gains in this act: control over foreign aid, defense appropriations, and significant influence over treaties (Whittington 184). Yet while the Congress had a greater role in formulating “defense priorities” the resolution “reflected the unwillingness of Congress to curtail sharply presidential warmaking and have only marginally constrained presidential action in the decades since (184).” The rationale for this bargain is clear: whereas Congress can offer discussion and debate, it cannot guarantee quick and decisive action (182-183). Instead the War Powers Resolution enshrines a “legislative veto,” that while giving Congress increased ability to debate the merits of a given conflict, leaves positive action to the President (183). Furthermore the act does not set legal boundaries for the President, leaving it to Congress to choose when to enforce their voice on Presidential action (186). Whittington argues, like Zelizer, the role of the Congress and President on national security has evolved over time: reflecting the needs of a military superpower. Yet Whittington stresses the ability of Congress to deliberate on the needs of national security.

Thus Whittington adds a nuanced historical description, backing up Fisher’s argument that Congress elected to not play its role in deciding the nation’s security priorities.

The Iraqi resolution showed the War Powers Resolution bypassed: with Congress handing to the President complete mastery over the framing of the debate. But at the same time, Whittington highlights the solidified primacy of the president in making wartime decisions. For Whittington the Congress’s role is to “mobilize popular support and to reflect popular dissent (178).” While Fisher may point to polls showing uncertainty about going to war with Iraq, it is clear that Congress did not fail in its role to reflect the public’s interest in light of clear public faith in the performance of the President.

So what come out of this discussion of Fisher, Zelizer, and Whittington?

Whittington shows that Congress never had control over warmaking coming into the 2002 debate. Any handover of power had occurred well before: with the War Powers Resolution granting the President primacy in warmaking ability as long as it followed popular sentiment.

Thus Fisher’s contention that Congress retreated from representing the public will is dubious: the nation overwhelmingly approved of Bush’s actions as commander-in-chief even while unsure of what action to take in Iraq. This reflected the changed political landscape after 9-11: with the American public looking to a strong executive to manage a national security state. Given these conditions, it seems Congress followed its proper role as envisioned by the War Powers Act.

This is not to suggest such a pathway is ideal: the aftermath of the Iraq War makes clear that the nation would have benefited from a greater Congressional counter-weight to executive authority. But to blame the political maneuvers that occurred in October 2002 is wrong; instead, one must look back to the War Powers Resolution as the true forfeiting of Congressional influence over warmaking policy.

The cause? The executive’s evolution into an administrator of a national security state. A trend that has only been heightened with the threat of international terrorism.

Can this be altered?

Fischer makes clear that there is room in the Constitution for a reformulating of warpowers between the President and the Congress. Yet, Zelizer’s work shows 1) that the opportunities for reforming Congress are few and far between and 2) Congress’s inability to match the President’s power in molding public opinion.

Such conditions cripple Congress from asserting itself as an equal partner to the President in decisions of war and peace in the near future.

 

Works Cited

Fisher, Louis. “The Way We Go to War: The Iraq Resolution,” in Gary L. Gregg and Mark J. Rozell, editors, Considering the Bush Presidency, Oxford University Press, 2004).

Noah, Timothy. “Zen and the Art of Political Cowardice.” December 4^th, 2001. Slate. http://www.slate.com/?id=2059333

Whittington, Keith E. Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning. (Harvard University Press, 1999), Chapter 5.

Zelizer, Julian E. On Capitol Hill: The Struggle to Reform Congress and Its Consequences, 1948-2000. (Cambridge University Press, 2004)

“Poll: Bush hasn’t made case for Iraq war.” Associated Press, 12/17/2002. http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002-12-17-iraq-poll_x.htm

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[1] http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002-12-17-iraq-poll_x.htm

[2] http://www.slate.com/?id=2059333