Executive Summary– The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding worst-case outcomes

(reproduced from summary’s original PDF format)

Avoiding worst-case outcomes, Mark Fitzpatrick, Director of the IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, notes that during 2009, Iran will probably reach the point at which it has produced enough low-enriched uranium to make a nuclear bomb – though it would first have to enrich it further. This will increasingly raise the
question of whether military action is needed in the absence of progress in diplomacy. However, the introduction of the Adelphi Paper argues that the question of ‘Iran with the bomb or a bombed Iran’ is a false dichotomy, because bombing Iran would probably do more to spur than to delay the country’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. In the aftermath of an unprovoked attack, Iran could be expected to withdraw from the NPT and engage the full resources of a unified nation in a determined nuclear-weapons development programme.

In framing the issue, Chapter One describes Iran’s pursuit of uranium enrichment and plutonium production facilities and concludes that its purpose is to acquire a weapons capability. Evidence for this purpose is to be found in the secrecy and deception behind the programme, the military connections and evidence of weapons development work, and the economic illogic of investing in these sensitive technologies without having any power plants that can use the enriched uranium.

Chapter Two assesses Western strategy to date, starting with the denial of supply policy tools employed for two decades and the more recent ‘demand-side’ strategies employing both sanctions and incentives. The strategies have failed in the past five years to stop Iran but this does not mean Iran is ‘winning.’ The outcome so far can best be characterized as ‘lose-lose.’

Chapter Three analyzes options for trying to keep Iran’s programme non-weaponised. Although the distinction is blurred in Iran’s case, being able to enrich uranium is not equivalent to having a nuclear weapon. The trick is how to build barriers between a latent Iranian nuclear weapons capability and actual weapons production. Recognizing the reality that Iran has such a latent capability need not mean accepting Iranian enrichment as legitimate. Iran’s uranium enrichment activity in defiance of five Security Council resolutions puts the nation in continuous breach of international law.

Assuming that Iran has not given up its weapons purpose, the paper assesses that Iran would not accept any limitations that would impede it from achieving a weapons capability. The problem can only be solved if Iran makes a strategic decision not to seek a nuclear weapons capability. Based on Iran’s past diplomacy, it can be expected to neither accept nor reject proposed restrictions, but rather to shunt them aside through non-responsive counter-proposals and endless negotiation and filibuster. Meanwhile, if the Security Council were to take a fallback position that accepted enrichment in Iran, doing so would incur the immediate cost of establishing a new negotiation benchmark.

The Adelphi Paper assesses various fallback options that have been offered for legalizing Iran’s enrichment in exchange for intrusive inspections and constraints on the programme. In theory, the concept of a multinational enrichment facility on Iranian soil may be the ‘least bad’ option, but in practice it is infeasible and would increase the net proliferation risk. On one hand, the risks of diversion and clandestine operations would be lowered by options that increased international knowledge about Iran’s nuclear programmes. But if this meant legalizing Iran’s programme, the result would be greater access to foreign technology and thereby an increased risk if Iran withdrew from the NPT. Legitimising enrichment in Iran would also contribute to the risk of a regional proliferation cascade by stimulating interest in enrichment elsewhere in the region.

Fitzpatrick concludes that the risks are best minimised by reinforcing the options presented to Iran of cooperation or isolation. If Iran continues to defy the Security Council, its enrichment programme can be constrained and delayed by export controls, sanctions, financial pressure, interdiction and other means of exploiting Iran’s vulnerabilities.

The West, in particular the United States, should seek to engage Iran. If Tehran shows a willingness to negotiate, incentives can be tabled, including ways to address Iran’s security concerns through an inclusive regional security structure.

In the likely event that Iran does acquire a latent nuclear-weapons capability, containment and deterrence strategies will be critical to keeping Iran from crossing the line to weapons production. Deterrence policies were employed effectively during the Cold War against far more powerful opponents, and there is reason to believe that such policies would be effective in forestalling the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran. A dual policy of engagement and sanctions, with containment strategies targeted at limiting Iranian access to sensitive technologies and materials, is still the best way to test possibilities for Iranian cooperation while maintaining vigilance and controls to limit the nuclear-proliferation threat.

Adelphi Paper 398
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Blog-On-Blog– The Ties that Bind, And the Ties That Don’t: US-India Nuclear Deal

(continued from this previous Proliferation Press posting)

For example, the United States supported the Pakistani regime. One of the requirements of the support was certification that Pakistan was not engaged in nuclear activity. But successive American Presidents—Reagan, Bush I and Clinton—all turned a blind eye to worrisome intelligence because of the immense strategic value of the US-Pakistan relationship. (For an excellent account of American policy towards Pakistan in respect to the nuclear question, read Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark’s book Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons)

End result: Pakistan ended up with nuclear weapons, and still held onto American miliary aid.

Furthermore, if the United States were firmly committed to ensuring the Indian nuclear stock-pile was neither modernized nor increased, it would require IAEA inspections of Indian military and civilian nuclear facilities. Yet, the US-India deal now only calls for civilian nuclear facility inspections—making India’s nuclear weapon program rather opaque to international eyes.

In short, rarely have proliferation concerns determined US foreign policy—especially in the case of the US-India nuclear deal.

Now there’s a simple argument in favor of the US-India nuclear deal. Until recently, India—with Pakistan, North Korea and Israel—occupy a nebulous zone in global politics: known, but unrecognized nuclear powers. Bringing India into the nuclear fold—by allowing it to enter nuclear fuel and technology deals with other recognized nuclear powers—patched a hole in the global system.

Yes, the US-India nuclear deal allows India to make nuclear deals with other countries as well—like Russia.

But it did so by a country-specific, not policy-specific manner. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) requires all nations to foreswear nuclear weapon development in return for technological and energy assistance from recognized nuclear powers. By letting a nuclear rogue like India—who never signed the treaty, and illegally manufactured nuclear weapons—get the keys to the nuclear candy store without offering similar treatment to other nations, one might wonder what message this sends to other countries: whether they be North Korea, Pakistan or Iran.

But proponents of the deal 1) recognized the difficulties of creating an issue-specific mechanism to bring in all troublesome nuclear nations and 2) argued the benefits—a alliance with India—would outweigh the risks.

But did America make India a steadfast ally—on par with Great Britain or Japan—from the nuclear deal? No. Rather the Bush administration made a high-stakes gambit, pegging that this status-granting agreement—tied with the nations’ liberal regimes—would better position America in a world facing a resurgent Russia and muscular China.

But the deal in no way forced India to carry the American line on China, Russia or even Iran. Any notion, as Maleki suggests, that India is the critical player in the Iranian nuclear crisis is short-sighted. Yes, gaining Indian to abstain on an IAEA vote did carry some weight. But the real obstacles to a de-nuclearized Iran are Russia and China, not India. (And there’s a considerable difference between India abstaining on a vote, than India actively lobbying for action against Iran’s nuclear program)

America and India are partners, just as Russia and India are partners. Where these relationships will go in the next years may heavily impact the global order. But any suggestion that the US-India nuclear deal 1) ties India’s hands in regards to their nuclear program or 2) instantly resulted in a new and defining alliance boldly thin contentions to make.  

Japanese Nuclear Flare Up Running Only On Fumes? Removed Air Force Chief Defends Revisionist Wartime History Views & Calls for Nuclear Weapon Debate

(continued from this Proliferation Press posting)

Bloomberg News reports on Tamogami’s call for a nuclear weapons debate in Japan:

“I think there should be debate about this, because nuclear deterrence would be enhanced as a result,” Toshio Tamogami, former head of the Air Defense Force, told reporters today at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan in Tokyo. Japan, which is bound by a post-war pacifist constitution drafted by the U.S., is a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso was forced to distance himself from Tamogami after the general published an essay that said Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek drew Japan into war with China. The essay drew condemnation from China and Tamogami was dismissed on Oct. 31.

A 2006 Christian Science Monitor report suggests the nuclear option isn’t on the table for Japan, but that Tamogami’s comments reflect a genuine desire among some Japanese officials to flex their nation’s military might:

“There is no way that the public would condone a nuclear weapons program,” says Michiko Kuga, a nonproliferation expert at the Japanese Defense Agency.

In order to acquire nuclear weapons, Japan would have to violate or withdraw from a number of international agreements, including the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Such a move would isolate Tokyo and ruin its chances for permanent membership in the UN Security Council, a long cherished goal.

Aside from undermining the continued extension of the US nuclear umbrella, Tokyo would certainly offend the sensibilities of its neighbors. North Korea already views Japan as a vassal of the US, and urged over the weekend that Tokyo be left out of the six-party talks on the grounds that the Abe administration are “political imbeciles,” incapable of recognizing the North as a nuclear state.

With neighbors like these, Japan perhaps has good reason to discuss a broader range of military options. The next step may be a revision of the nation’s Constitution, which prohibits the use of force. Abe wants to enact a new national charter within five years that has a more realistic approach to security matters.

A Nov. 2008 IPSNews report suggests Japan suggests a “middle power” path for Japan, with nationalistic calls for nuclear weapons & revisions to Japan’s military constraints unlikely to be enacted:

WASHINGTON, Nov 24 (IPS) – Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is nose-diving in the polls, its gaffe-prone prime minister Taro Aso has acquired a reputation as his party’s funeral director, and a pivotal election may transform the Japanese political landscape before September.

Particularly at stake is the country’s military and foreign policy. Currently, Japan is caught between its “peace constitution” and a much more assertive military policy envisioned by the conservative wing of the LDP. 

With the country dealing with economic decline and political uncertainty, some scholars are trying to find another way for Japan to relate to the world. Yoshihide Soeya, a professor of political science at Keio University and a member of several government councils, has been one of the leading proponents of a middle way for Japan. 

Speaking at a seminar in Washington, DC on Nov. 20, sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Soeya outlined his vision of Japan as a middle power staking out terrain between the great powers of the United States and China. 

Central to his argument is the assertion that Japan itself is not and does not want to be a great power. The country’s constitution and its alliance with the United States — which Soeya argued had not changed in the last half century and would not likely change in the near future — constrained such ambitions, even if they sometimes crop up on the popular debate. 

“Particularly in the domain of traditional security, where the military plays an important role, Japan’s role has not been that of a great power,” Soeya maintained. “And there is nothing to suggest that Japan is moving in that direction. Some discourses in Japan might give you the impression that that is happening. But it is not taking place at the policy level.” 

To illustrate this point, Soeya identified elements of middle-power diplomacy in Japan’s postwar policy. It provided economic assistance to Southeast Asia and China. It emphasized the concept of human security, which expands traditional definitions of security to include human needs such as food and shelter. And it labored long and hard within multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. 

…

“There is an increasing argument calling for the right of collective self-defense as part of Japanese security policy,” Soeya noted. “But the extent to which this is part of a larger strategic debate is questionable. There have been maybe public opinion makers, but not political actors, who have argued for the right of collective self-defense.’’ 

‘’Simultaneously they have talked about what the future would look like if Japan had that right,’’ Soeya said. ‘’For me, that would mean Japan fighting an American war, just as other middle powers like Australia and South Korea have fought America’s wars.” 

But that, Soeya continued, would be a step Japan would have to take. Becoming a middle power, in his conception, would require constitutional revision. “Without changing Article 9,” he argued, “Japan can’t become a full-fledged middle power. It can’t become part of peacekeeping or multilateral forces like Canadian forces in Afghanistan.” 

But Soeya was skeptical that such a change was in the works. “Japan has to start thinking about a post-revision strategy,” he concluded. “At that point, Japan will become a country that can fight in an American war. But I really doubt whether the Japanese public is ready for that.”