Blog-On-Blog– The Ties that Bind, And the Ties That Don’t: US-India Nuclear Deal

(continued from this previous Proliferation Press posting)

For example, the United States supported the Pakistani regime. One of the requirements of the support was certification that Pakistan was not engaged in nuclear activity. But successive American Presidents—Reagan, Bush I and Clinton—all turned a blind eye to worrisome intelligence because of the immense strategic value of the US-Pakistan relationship. (For an excellent account of American policy towards Pakistan in respect to the nuclear question, read Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark’s book Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons)

End result: Pakistan ended up with nuclear weapons, and still held onto American miliary aid.

Furthermore, if the United States were firmly committed to ensuring the Indian nuclear stock-pile was neither modernized nor increased, it would require IAEA inspections of Indian military and civilian nuclear facilities. Yet, the US-India deal now only calls for civilian nuclear facility inspections—making India’s nuclear weapon program rather opaque to international eyes.

In short, rarely have proliferation concerns determined US foreign policy—especially in the case of the US-India nuclear deal.

Now there’s a simple argument in favor of the US-India nuclear deal. Until recently, India—with Pakistan, North Korea and Israel—occupy a nebulous zone in global politics: known, but unrecognized nuclear powers. Bringing India into the nuclear fold—by allowing it to enter nuclear fuel and technology deals with other recognized nuclear powers—patched a hole in the global system.

Yes, the US-India nuclear deal allows India to make nuclear deals with other countries as well—like Russia.

But it did so by a country-specific, not policy-specific manner. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) requires all nations to foreswear nuclear weapon development in return for technological and energy assistance from recognized nuclear powers. By letting a nuclear rogue like India—who never signed the treaty, and illegally manufactured nuclear weapons—get the keys to the nuclear candy store without offering similar treatment to other nations, one might wonder what message this sends to other countries: whether they be North Korea, Pakistan or Iran.

But proponents of the deal 1) recognized the difficulties of creating an issue-specific mechanism to bring in all troublesome nuclear nations and 2) argued the benefits—a alliance with India—would outweigh the risks.

But did America make India a steadfast ally—on par with Great Britain or Japan—from the nuclear deal? No. Rather the Bush administration made a high-stakes gambit, pegging that this status-granting agreement—tied with the nations’ liberal regimes—would better position America in a world facing a resurgent Russia and muscular China.

But the deal in no way forced India to carry the American line on China, Russia or even Iran. Any notion, as Maleki suggests, that India is the critical player in the Iranian nuclear crisis is short-sighted. Yes, gaining Indian to abstain on an IAEA vote did carry some weight. But the real obstacles to a de-nuclearized Iran are Russia and China, not India. (And there’s a considerable difference between India abstaining on a vote, than India actively lobbying for action against Iran’s nuclear program)

America and India are partners, just as Russia and India are partners. Where these relationships will go in the next years may heavily impact the global order. But any suggestion that the US-India nuclear deal 1) ties India’s hands in regards to their nuclear program or 2) instantly resulted in a new and defining alliance boldly thin contentions to make.