Susan Burk Returns As U.S. Representative to the High Stakes 2010 NPT Review Conference

Summary: Obama has made it clear he sees the “sound” Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as critical to stemming nuclear weapons proliferation. So what will Obama’s bold nuclear moves-warming up to Russia on a new START treaty, calling for eventual nuclear weapons abolition, and bringing focus back to the NPT-yield? It’s too soon to tell. But the nomination Susan Burk as Special Representative reflects the high aims Obama has for the 2010 meeting. Below is a review of Burk’s testimony to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and discussion of NPT 2010 meeting’s significance to Obamaland foreign policy.

Two key-if little noted-nominees for diplomatic roles in the Obama White House testified before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday.  Ivo Daalder has been tapped for U.S. Representative on the NATO Council, and Sarah Burk has been nominated for U.S. Representative to the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.

President Obama’s recently announced commitment[i] to revitalizing the NPT to stem nuclear proliferation brings Burk’s likely role special significance.

Burk, if confirmed, will play a major role in the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Held every five years, these meetings bring together the 188 treaty members to discuss nonproliferation and disarmament issues. With Iran inching closer towards nuclear weapons capability and North Korea reneging on its pledge to disarm, this meeting may be the last chance to exert multinational pressure on these rogue states.

NPT meetings have had a erratic track record. In 1995, with Susan Burk heading up Clinton’s delegation, the NPT treaty was renewed permanently. But the 2000 conference was marked more by what was avoided (fears of collapse in the wake of 1998 nuclear tests of Pakistan and India), and 2005’s has been considered “a near total fiasco.”[ii]

Iran, as a member of the NPT, holds a unique test for the treaty regime. While Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea have developed nuclear weapons since the treaty’s ratification, none were members of the NPT (North Korea left the organization before developing its limited nuclear weapons capability). Iran crossing the nuclear line would represent the treaty’s largest failure-and call into question its grand bargain of nonproliferation in return for peaceful nuclear technology sharing and eventual nuclear weapons disarmament.

Susan Burk’s opening statement offers a concise review of the Obama administration nonproliferation policy aims and the challenges it faces as it heads into the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The administration has an ambitious agenda, calling for:

* Nuclear Fissile Material Cut-Off treaty

*  Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

*  Successor to the START treaty between Russia and United States

*  WMD Free-Zone in the Middle East

*  IAEA Nuclear Fuel Bank to spur peaceful uses of nuclear technology

Burk also states her intent to shepherd international support against potential Iran nuclear weapons proliferation and North Korea’s nuclear program:

The second pillar of the Treaty is nonproliferation. The United States, along with other NPT Parties, must act with urgency to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. We need tough and smart diplomacy – backed by real incentives and real pressures – to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon capability and to achieve the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

And on the NPT itself she stated:

If confirmed, I will work with colleagues in the State Department and elsewhere in the government, as well as other NPT stakeholders, to lay the groundwork for a 2010 Review Conference that will reinforce the Treaty as an effective legal and political barrier to nuclear proliferation.

Obama’s call for eventual nuclear abolition puts the NPT front and center. We will see if improved relations with Russia and Europe, not to mention Latin America and Asia, yield any rewards at this global conference. Past conferences have seen success and utter failure. If used effectively, the 2010 NPT conference could signal a unified voice against recent Iranian and North Korean nuclear policies. Furthermore, the diplomatic moves of other nations will determine whether or not an Iranian nuclear weapons capability sets off a nuclear-arms race throughout the Middle East.

While many external factors will shape results of the 2010 NPT Conference, the conference will be an early indicator on the effectiveness of President Obama’s foreign policy.

 

Related Materials

i On April 5th, 2009 President Barack Obama delivered an address on nuclear weapons in Czech Republic city of Prague. His speech highlighted the importance of the NPT:

Second, together we will strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a basis for cooperation.

The basic bargain is sound: Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy. To strengthen the treaty, we should embrace several principles. We need more resources and authority to strengthen international inspections. We need real and immediate consequences for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the treaty without cause.

…

But we go forward with no illusions. Some countries will break the rules. That’s why we need a structure in place that ensures when any nation does, they will face consequences.

Just this morning, we were reminded again of why we need a new and more rigorous approach to address this threat. North Korea broke the rules once again by testing a rocket that could be used for long range missiles. This provocation underscores the need for action — not just this afternoon at the U.N. Security Council, but in our determination to prevent the spread of these weapons.

Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something. The world must stand together to prevent the spread of these weapons. Now is the time for a strong international response — (applause) — now is the time for a strong international response, and North Korea must know that the path to security and respect will never come through threats and illegal weapons. All nations must come together to build a stronger, global regime. And that’s why we must stand shoulder to shoulder to pressure the North Koreans to change course.

ii Quinlan, Michael. Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects. Telegraph review article, April 23rd 2009:

The next NPT review conference, due in 2010, has a chance to redeem itself after what the author rightly calls the “near-total fiasco” of its predecessor four years ago. It could be a key step towards the eventual abolition of weapons whose “lethal enormity” has changed the nature of warfare. Quinlan writes that few informed commentators would put at more than 50-50 the chances of reaching that goal by 2045, the centenary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The road ahead will be long, difficult and uncertain.

Torturing Over Torture in Obamaland: What The Pundits Are Missing; The Zelikow Memo

Summary: Members of the Obama administration and the DC punditry should read Philip Zelikow’s recent blog at Foreign Policy magazine. He reminds us that the question over torture isn’t whether Obamaland botched its handling or the effectiveness of the interrogation techniques, but the morality and consequences of prusuing a policy torture. This is not to suggest morality of the day should override laws, but rather when pursuing a policy it may be sometimes best to ask ‘ought we be doing this?’ before asking ‘how can we do this?’. Sometimes seeking out covert justifications for a decision open more troublesome dillemas.

It’s been a tough week for the Obama administration. Pundits have almost universally failing marks to Obamaland’s handling of the torture issue. Either he’s being too soft (not going after the interrogators and failing to fess up to the intelligence gained by Bush era enhanced interrogation techniques) or he’s being too hard (chasing after lawyers who were doing what they could to defend American security).

And the pundits don’t stop there. How President Barack Obama aired the issue has brought stiff rebukes. Only releasing some memos has opened the White House to charges that it’s cherry picking. And it hasn’t helped that in a draft memo CIA Director Dennis Blair admitted enhanced interrogation techniques worked, only to have it deleted upon official release.

So not only are the wing-nuts on both sides unhappy, the press has caught the White House not being transparent on a tier-one issue—analogous to catching a teenager with their pants down at the school dance.

Now none of this is surprising: the torture issue is thorny, and there was no ‘perfect’ solution for Obama come to. This becomes painfully obvious when one sees conservatives (read Dick Cheney) sensing the torture issue as the wedge issue to revitalize Republican Party (particularly if there is another terrorist attack on America or its allies).

Listening on torture: Philip Zelikow's recent Foreign Policy article offers some valuable, if indirect, advice to the administration. Before deciding on how to deal with torture, we must first analyze the moral and practical consequences to permitting enhanced interrogation techniques. In calling for a moral analysis of torture, Zelikow implicitly highlights the value of frank and open discussion. While Americans know Obama is against torture, it might be worth reminding them why.

But this all overlooks a basic point: yes, torture can work. But does that mean only torture works, and how is American society impacted by water-boarding terrorists? By bypassing this valuable discussion (or simply trying to recycle news-cycles), the media has flooded the public with talking points & juvenile discussions over who’s up & who’s down.

Absent in this high-minded prattle has been serious analysis of this vital moral and national security issue.

And that is why Philip Zelikow’s recent blog entry on Foreign Policy is so important. There Zelikow reveals his authorship of a dissenting memo towards the Bush administration’s legal reasoning on enhanced interrogation techniques. Boilded down he brings these crucial points to the debate over torture:

1)      Water-boarding misses the point: “Before getting to water-boarding, the captive had already been stripped naked, shackled to ceiling chains keeping him standing so he cannot fall asleep for extended periods, hosed periodically with cold water, slapped around, jammed into boxes, etc. etc. Sleep deprivation is most important.” 

2)      The CIA techniques being used were “proscribed by current case-law” (i.e. illegal) 

3)      In legally justifying their policies the Bush White House did not claim a right only to torture non-citizen terrorists, but had to argue that US citizens could be tortured with compelling national security concerns. Or as he states much more brutally, “Americans in any town of this country could constitutionally be hung from the ceiling naked, sleep deprived, water-boarded, and all the rest — if the alleged national security justification was compelling.” 

4)      Upon distrubing his memo, Zelikow soon discovered that the White House attempted to gather and destroy all copies

Zelikow shows exactly how America got into this torture mess—by the Bush administration actively avoiding a moral discussion over the role of torture in national security, and instead giving life to truly dangerous legal interpretations. As such he reminds us that the discussion over whether or not truly dangerous terrorists cannot be separated from the larger question torture in American society.

The Bush administration, for reasons of national security, did a profound disservice by avoiding a frank discussion on torture. When weighing that against Obama’s decision to curtail torture and messy delivery, recent Obama administration criticisms come across toothless and swallow.

But Zelikow—who’s “rough guess is that physical coercion can break people faster, with some tradeoff in degraded and less reliable results”—demands we bring the discussion back to morality. By avoiding this discussion the Bush administration pushed covert and pernicious legal justifications whose reverberations may have done caused more problems that they solved.

The lesson for Obamaland? Have the discussion. Hold a presidential press conference.

Update 5:12 pm: Next Wedneday–coincidently his 100th day in office–Barack Obama will hold his third presidential press conference.

Blog-on-Blog: About Jeffrey Goldberg Blog Bashing Roger Cohen

Summary: Let’s move on from debates over the character of the Iranian regime; it gets us no closer to the real questions: 1) how best to deter Iran from going nuclear and 2) if Iran develops nuclear weapons, how best to prevent catastrophe.

Yesterday Jeffrey Goldberg dedicated his Atlantic blog entry to exposing NYTimes columnist Roger Cohen’s shallow conception of the Iranian threat faced by Israel. You can read/watch the ‘Cohen evisceration’ here in full, but here’s boiled down version:

-Roger Cohen debated Rabbi David Wolpe; the topic: Iran and Israel

-Wolpe insists Cohen imagine a time when the balance of power between Iran and Israel flips: meaning when Iran has nuclear weapons/equal or greater conventional military capabilities. Add to this that Hamas and Hezbollah are Iran proxies, and thus would reap direct benefits from such strategic flip.

-Cohen waffles—says some things about stopping Iran from getting The Bomb. Audience laughs.

The problems with this semantic takedown (even if Contentions gives it kudos):

A.      Iran gaining non-nuclear parity with Israel

While Israeli armed forces are more sophisticated, Iran could already damage Israel with a combo-punch of ballistic missiles and, yes, funded terrorist attacks on Israel 

Why hasn’t this happened?

The Israeli nuclear shield: If Iran ever made such a unilateral move, the regime would be over. 

B.      But what if Iran gets The Bomb? 

The counter to the Goldberg/Wolpe point: couldn’t a nuclear Iran and nuclear Israel follow general deterrence theory? 

Yes, one could believe that Iran really wants to destroy Israel no matter the price—even if the price is the destruction of Iran itself. But if such a fanatical approach was true, why wouldn’t Iran do it now? Heck, even if they just try to get Israel to launch enough nuclear weapons—the after-effects of the attack could do the trick. 

C.      Defensive Reasons for an Iranian nuclear weapons program

Not unlike Russia responding to the American nuke, China responding to nuclear bullying, or Pakistan reacting to the India’s nuclear acquisition, there are rational and defensive reasons for Tehran to seek The Bomb. Israel is a nuclear-weapons state, and the Iranian regime has learned (thanks to Iraq) that actually having weapons is the best defense from regime change. And, yes, on top of that a nuclear Tehran would most likely become the hegemon of the Arab world. 

These benefits go away if Tehran either attacks Israel, or hands off a nuclear suitcase to Hamas. If India and Pakistan could stop themselves from pressing the button, Iran and Israel can do the same. 

D.      Reasons to Fear a Nuclear-Armed Iran/What We Should Be Talking About 

I am not fan of a nuclear-armed Iran. The current Iranian regime is an unstable, autocratic and exceeding dangerous one. 

But my concerns over a nuclear-armed Iran are as follows: 

- It could lead to a massive nuclear build-up between Israel and Iran

-plunge the Middle East into a nuclear proliferating arms race

-result: greatly increase the likelihood of a nuclear accident or nuclear misread 

These are the reasons to fear a nuclear-armed Iran, not the Wolpe/Goldberg thesis. And if they really want to find a problem with Cohen’s position, they should read Daniel Drenzer’s blog at FP. 

the real debate isn’t over the attitude of the Iranian regime (a murky, passionate and—at heart—subjective debate), but how to effectively deter Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. And how best to prepare the global community for an Iranian nuke would be a good backup discussion. 

Executive Summary– The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding worst-case outcomes

(reproduced from summary’s original PDF format)

Avoiding worst-case outcomes, Mark Fitzpatrick, Director of the IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, notes that during 2009, Iran will probably reach the point at which it has produced enough low-enriched uranium to make a nuclear bomb – though it would first have to enrich it further. This will increasingly raise the
question of whether military action is needed in the absence of progress in diplomacy. However, the introduction of the Adelphi Paper argues that the question of ‘Iran with the bomb or a bombed Iran’ is a false dichotomy, because bombing Iran would probably do more to spur than to delay the country’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. In the aftermath of an unprovoked attack, Iran could be expected to withdraw from the NPT and engage the full resources of a unified nation in a determined nuclear-weapons development programme.

In framing the issue, Chapter One describes Iran’s pursuit of uranium enrichment and plutonium production facilities and concludes that its purpose is to acquire a weapons capability. Evidence for this purpose is to be found in the secrecy and deception behind the programme, the military connections and evidence of weapons development work, and the economic illogic of investing in these sensitive technologies without having any power plants that can use the enriched uranium.

Chapter Two assesses Western strategy to date, starting with the denial of supply policy tools employed for two decades and the more recent ‘demand-side’ strategies employing both sanctions and incentives. The strategies have failed in the past five years to stop Iran but this does not mean Iran is ‘winning.’ The outcome so far can best be characterized as ‘lose-lose.’

Chapter Three analyzes options for trying to keep Iran’s programme non-weaponised. Although the distinction is blurred in Iran’s case, being able to enrich uranium is not equivalent to having a nuclear weapon. The trick is how to build barriers between a latent Iranian nuclear weapons capability and actual weapons production. Recognizing the reality that Iran has such a latent capability need not mean accepting Iranian enrichment as legitimate. Iran’s uranium enrichment activity in defiance of five Security Council resolutions puts the nation in continuous breach of international law.

Assuming that Iran has not given up its weapons purpose, the paper assesses that Iran would not accept any limitations that would impede it from achieving a weapons capability. The problem can only be solved if Iran makes a strategic decision not to seek a nuclear weapons capability. Based on Iran’s past diplomacy, it can be expected to neither accept nor reject proposed restrictions, but rather to shunt them aside through non-responsive counter-proposals and endless negotiation and filibuster. Meanwhile, if the Security Council were to take a fallback position that accepted enrichment in Iran, doing so would incur the immediate cost of establishing a new negotiation benchmark.

The Adelphi Paper assesses various fallback options that have been offered for legalizing Iran’s enrichment in exchange for intrusive inspections and constraints on the programme. In theory, the concept of a multinational enrichment facility on Iranian soil may be the ‘least bad’ option, but in practice it is infeasible and would increase the net proliferation risk. On one hand, the risks of diversion and clandestine operations would be lowered by options that increased international knowledge about Iran’s nuclear programmes. But if this meant legalizing Iran’s programme, the result would be greater access to foreign technology and thereby an increased risk if Iran withdrew from the NPT. Legitimising enrichment in Iran would also contribute to the risk of a regional proliferation cascade by stimulating interest in enrichment elsewhere in the region.

Fitzpatrick concludes that the risks are best minimised by reinforcing the options presented to Iran of cooperation or isolation. If Iran continues to defy the Security Council, its enrichment programme can be constrained and delayed by export controls, sanctions, financial pressure, interdiction and other means of exploiting Iran’s vulnerabilities.

The West, in particular the United States, should seek to engage Iran. If Tehran shows a willingness to negotiate, incentives can be tabled, including ways to address Iran’s security concerns through an inclusive regional security structure.

In the likely event that Iran does acquire a latent nuclear-weapons capability, containment and deterrence strategies will be critical to keeping Iran from crossing the line to weapons production. Deterrence policies were employed effectively during the Cold War against far more powerful opponents, and there is reason to believe that such policies would be effective in forestalling the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran. A dual policy of engagement and sanctions, with containment strategies targeted at limiting Iranian access to sensitive technologies and materials, is still the best way to test possibilities for Iranian cooperation while maintaining vigilance and controls to limit the nuclear-proliferation threat.

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Blog-On-Blog– The Ties that Bind, And the Ties That Don’t: US-India Nuclear Deal

(continued from this previous Proliferation Press posting)

For example, the United States supported the Pakistani regime. One of the requirements of the support was certification that Pakistan was not engaged in nuclear activity. But successive American Presidents—Reagan, Bush I and Clinton—all turned a blind eye to worrisome intelligence because of the immense strategic value of the US-Pakistan relationship. (For an excellent account of American policy towards Pakistan in respect to the nuclear question, read Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark’s book Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons)

End result: Pakistan ended up with nuclear weapons, and still held onto American miliary aid.

Furthermore, if the United States were firmly committed to ensuring the Indian nuclear stock-pile was neither modernized nor increased, it would require IAEA inspections of Indian military and civilian nuclear facilities. Yet, the US-India deal now only calls for civilian nuclear facility inspections—making India’s nuclear weapon program rather opaque to international eyes.

In short, rarely have proliferation concerns determined US foreign policy—especially in the case of the US-India nuclear deal.

Now there’s a simple argument in favor of the US-India nuclear deal. Until recently, India—with Pakistan, North Korea and Israel—occupy a nebulous zone in global politics: known, but unrecognized nuclear powers. Bringing India into the nuclear fold—by allowing it to enter nuclear fuel and technology deals with other recognized nuclear powers—patched a hole in the global system.

Yes, the US-India nuclear deal allows India to make nuclear deals with other countries as well—like Russia.

But it did so by a country-specific, not policy-specific manner. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) requires all nations to foreswear nuclear weapon development in return for technological and energy assistance from recognized nuclear powers. By letting a nuclear rogue like India—who never signed the treaty, and illegally manufactured nuclear weapons—get the keys to the nuclear candy store without offering similar treatment to other nations, one might wonder what message this sends to other countries: whether they be North Korea, Pakistan or Iran.

But proponents of the deal 1) recognized the difficulties of creating an issue-specific mechanism to bring in all troublesome nuclear nations and 2) argued the benefits—a alliance with India—would outweigh the risks.

But did America make India a steadfast ally—on par with Great Britain or Japan—from the nuclear deal? No. Rather the Bush administration made a high-stakes gambit, pegging that this status-granting agreement—tied with the nations’ liberal regimes—would better position America in a world facing a resurgent Russia and muscular China.

But the deal in no way forced India to carry the American line on China, Russia or even Iran. Any notion, as Maleki suggests, that India is the critical player in the Iranian nuclear crisis is short-sighted. Yes, gaining Indian to abstain on an IAEA vote did carry some weight. But the real obstacles to a de-nuclearized Iran are Russia and China, not India. (And there’s a considerable difference between India abstaining on a vote, than India actively lobbying for action against Iran’s nuclear program)

America and India are partners, just as Russia and India are partners. Where these relationships will go in the next years may heavily impact the global order. But any suggestion that the US-India nuclear deal 1) ties India’s hands in regards to their nuclear program or 2) instantly resulted in a new and defining alliance boldly thin contentions to make.  

Japanese Nuclear Flare Up Running Only On Fumes? Removed Air Force Chief Defends Revisionist Wartime History Views & Calls for Nuclear Weapon Debate

(continued from this Proliferation Press posting)

Bloomberg News reports on Tamogami’s call for a nuclear weapons debate in Japan:

“I think there should be debate about this, because nuclear deterrence would be enhanced as a result,” Toshio Tamogami, former head of the Air Defense Force, told reporters today at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan in Tokyo. Japan, which is bound by a post-war pacifist constitution drafted by the U.S., is a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso was forced to distance himself from Tamogami after the general published an essay that said Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek drew Japan into war with China. The essay drew condemnation from China and Tamogami was dismissed on Oct. 31.

A 2006 Christian Science Monitor report suggests the nuclear option isn’t on the table for Japan, but that Tamogami’s comments reflect a genuine desire among some Japanese officials to flex their nation’s military might:

“There is no way that the public would condone a nuclear weapons program,” says Michiko Kuga, a nonproliferation expert at the Japanese Defense Agency.

In order to acquire nuclear weapons, Japan would have to violate or withdraw from a number of international agreements, including the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Such a move would isolate Tokyo and ruin its chances for permanent membership in the UN Security Council, a long cherished goal.

Aside from undermining the continued extension of the US nuclear umbrella, Tokyo would certainly offend the sensibilities of its neighbors. North Korea already views Japan as a vassal of the US, and urged over the weekend that Tokyo be left out of the six-party talks on the grounds that the Abe administration are “political imbeciles,” incapable of recognizing the North as a nuclear state.

With neighbors like these, Japan perhaps has good reason to discuss a broader range of military options. The next step may be a revision of the nation’s Constitution, which prohibits the use of force. Abe wants to enact a new national charter within five years that has a more realistic approach to security matters.

A Nov. 2008 IPSNews report suggests Japan suggests a “middle power” path for Japan, with nationalistic calls for nuclear weapons & revisions to Japan’s military constraints unlikely to be enacted:

WASHINGTON, Nov 24 (IPS) – Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is nose-diving in the polls, its gaffe-prone prime minister Taro Aso has acquired a reputation as his party’s funeral director, and a pivotal election may transform the Japanese political landscape before September.

Particularly at stake is the country’s military and foreign policy. Currently, Japan is caught between its “peace constitution” and a much more assertive military policy envisioned by the conservative wing of the LDP. 

With the country dealing with economic decline and political uncertainty, some scholars are trying to find another way for Japan to relate to the world. Yoshihide Soeya, a professor of political science at Keio University and a member of several government councils, has been one of the leading proponents of a middle way for Japan. 

Speaking at a seminar in Washington, DC on Nov. 20, sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Soeya outlined his vision of Japan as a middle power staking out terrain between the great powers of the United States and China. 

Central to his argument is the assertion that Japan itself is not and does not want to be a great power. The country’s constitution and its alliance with the United States — which Soeya argued had not changed in the last half century and would not likely change in the near future — constrained such ambitions, even if they sometimes crop up on the popular debate. 

“Particularly in the domain of traditional security, where the military plays an important role, Japan’s role has not been that of a great power,” Soeya maintained. “And there is nothing to suggest that Japan is moving in that direction. Some discourses in Japan might give you the impression that that is happening. But it is not taking place at the policy level.” 

To illustrate this point, Soeya identified elements of middle-power diplomacy in Japan’s postwar policy. It provided economic assistance to Southeast Asia and China. It emphasized the concept of human security, which expands traditional definitions of security to include human needs such as food and shelter. And it labored long and hard within multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. 

…

“There is an increasing argument calling for the right of collective self-defense as part of Japanese security policy,” Soeya noted. “But the extent to which this is part of a larger strategic debate is questionable. There have been maybe public opinion makers, but not political actors, who have argued for the right of collective self-defense.’’ 

‘’Simultaneously they have talked about what the future would look like if Japan had that right,’’ Soeya said. ‘’For me, that would mean Japan fighting an American war, just as other middle powers like Australia and South Korea have fought America’s wars.” 

But that, Soeya continued, would be a step Japan would have to take. Becoming a middle power, in his conception, would require constitutional revision. “Without changing Article 9,” he argued, “Japan can’t become a full-fledged middle power. It can’t become part of peacekeeping or multilateral forces like Canadian forces in Afghanistan.” 

But Soeya was skeptical that such a change was in the works. “Japan has to start thinking about a post-revision strategy,” he concluded. “At that point, Japan will become a country that can fight in an American war. But I really doubt whether the Japanese public is ready for that.” 

Dealing with North Korea: The Case for the Kaesong Industrial Complex

by K. Edmund White

Does the solution to menacing North Korean regime rest in a North Korean industrial complex?

No. But a large part of that solution just might.

The Kaesong Industrial Facility represents a joint North and South Korean business venture. Here’s a good, if slightly out-of-date, description of the site:

The KIC opened in June 2004 under a contract between North Korea and South Korea’s Hyundai Asan Corporation and South Korea’s state-owned Korea Land Corporation. The complex is located between the North Korean city of Kaesong and the western border between the two Koreas. The workers produce goods mostly for the South Korean market, including watches, shoes, clothes, kitchenware, plastic containers, electrical cords and car parts, among other items. As of August, more than 8,000 [note: now closer to 13,000] North Korean workers were employed by 13 South Korean companies.

In essence it’s a grand bargain. North Korea gets tax revenue it desperately needs to survive. Meanwhile, South Korea gets cheap labor that speaks the same language. And both sides can push it as proof-positive of the natural connection between the two Koreas.

But this site may also play a role within the Korean nuclear crisis. It may serve, in the short term, as a carrot (that can be dangled) to force North Korea to give up their WMD program.

And, in the long term, it could yield the following outcomes:

1) The Kaesong Complex, reflecting South Korean economic standards, will show North Koreans first-hand the backwardness of their economic system

2) Any eventual reunification plan—which could see America lose influence in Korea—will come at a steep price: the disparity between the two Koreas is extreme. But joint ventures such as Kaesong can, if properly implemented, help dull the profound economic divide between North and South.

Making Kaesong a sucess reflects good policy and reaffirms America’s message to the world: dovetailing economic and political freedom (i.e. free market, liberal governing principles) not only reflect a more humane belief system, but provide all peoples greater material rewards.

Charles Pritchard, author of Failed Diplomacy, worked the North Korea problem in both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations—as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and as U.S. Ambassador and special envoy for negotiations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, respectively. We discussed Kaesong, and the Bush administration’s refusal to view these products as South Korean (thereby making them less marketable):

Pritchard: It’s a paradox. Even if the Bush administration desired the downfall of North Korea, if that were policy of the President, and he really wanted to see that, then he should then tell the South Koreans to make Kaesong bigger, better, faster now. Hire many more North Koreans. Have 100,000 workers there. Because the more North Koreans are exposed to work conditions and state of the art equipment—the welfare, the food, all of that stuff in stark contrast to what they have in North Korea—the faster there will be a public unease about the nature of their own regime.

That’s the silliness of the Bush administration. They ought to be promoting Kaesong even if they don’t like the regime, for those very reasons. And if you want to enhance US-South Korea relationship, you ought to be promoting joint ventures between the Koreas.

And in the long-term, providing larger-scale opportunities for North Koreans to see the benefits of something that’s close to market economy is a minimum to reinforcing the economic reforms of July 2002. That reform has since gone sputtering along. So Kaesong, from a negative and positive view, is a good deal and we’re just no making enough out of it.” (June 8^th interview)

But critics of Kaesong point to troublesome workers’ rights record. From a October 2006 Human Rights Watch article:

Human Rights Watch also found that South Korean companies are violating the existing KIC Labor Law, which stipulates that employers should pay workers directly in cash. An employers’ representative told Human Rights Watch that the South Korean companies have been asked instead to pay workers’ wages in U.S. dollars directly to the North Korean government, which in turn pays the workers in North Korean won after deducting a mandatory 30 percent contribution to a social welfare fund.

“The fact that North Korea has already managed to get South Korean companies to violate worker’s rights on wage payments is not only an embarrassment, but also raises concerns about other violations at Kaesong,” said Richardson.

The Sky Isn’t Falling! Mueller Goes “Overblown” at Cato: Why Terrorism Isn’t Our Greatest Danger—We Are

Field Report

by kwhite

Today John Mueller spoke on America’s distorted view on the threat posed by terrorism, and how continuing irrationality on homeland security imperils American security.

The talk, sponsored by the Cato Institute and taped on C-Span, offered Mueller an opportunity to discuss his new book, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats and Why We Believe Them.

“The scope of the [terrorism] threat is substantially exaggerated,” Mueller told the crowded hall, adding that terrorism, “is not an existential threat.”

Unfortunately for Mueller, the only one agreeing with him so far is Michael Moore. The concession drew laughs from the crowd at Cato, a conservative/libertarian think tank in Washington, D.C.

Mueller’s presentation made three basic points: 1) the threat of dying from terrorism is small, 2) that playing on this fear has led to foolish policies, and 3) there is a reasonable alternative counter-terrorism strategy.

Mueller compared statistics about terrorism with seemingly more benign matters.  The results, however, put things into perspective.  For instance, a person has an equal chance of being killing by a comet or asteroid as from a terrorist attack. Throwing in yet another statistic, he told the crowd the number of people that have died from terrorist acts is on par with fatalities from bathtub tub drownings. He also harped on an important fact: not one serious terrorist cell has been found in the United States since 9/11.

Unfortunately the fear and speculation about another terrorist attack has brought significant consequences—large government spending, two wars, and an erosion of our individual liberties.

Spending has been wasted. Mueller points out the resort Weeki Wachee Springs, showcasing a Mermaid show, that has been designated a terrorist target, thus making it eligible for homeland security funds. The two wars are not going exceedingly well, as seen by eroding support for President George W. Bush. And recent controversies over data-mining and wire-tapping have led many to complain about America’s diminishing civil liberties.

And all the effectiveness of these controversial policies has been increasingly scrutinized by members of both political parties.

Cato’s Jim Harper, moderating the event, brought focus to his recent study exploring the profound limitations—and considerable cost—of data mining.

Former Governor James Gilmore (R-VA), the sole commenter at the event, spoke highly of the book hailing its “counter-cultural approach” as “encourage[ing] people to think.”

But Gilmore did shift the focus back to the reality of the threat by issuing the caution, “Don’t kid yourself, we’re in a war if not against terrorism against terrorists.” But he urged that our country to “have some sense of proportion.”

Gilmore was skeptical of complete success on this front, lamenting America’s “entertainment society” that rewards sensational news coverage on all topics–including homeland security.

Gilmore is a respected voice on security matters. Before going into politics, Gilmore served as a counter-terrorism agent and recently headed up the Congressional Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. Today he is Chairman of the National Council on Readiness and Preparedness.

Though Gilmore does envision greater transparency on matters of national security and increased engagement by ordinary citizens as constructive steps towards a “secure and free” America.

Mueller was pessimistic on the chances of sweeping change, seemingly pushing for improvement on the margins, i.e. limiting the damage of strategic missteps. But he did think the recent Democratic victory in Congress offered a chance for greater accountability on both the expenditures and policies of the up-to-now unchallenged Bush White House. He also pushed for publicizing the number of false alarms, reassessing some safety standards, following past examples of restraint (the 1983 Beirut bombing on U.S. forces and the destruction of Pam Am Flight 103), and simple common sense as ways to properly recalibrate our homeland security policies.

But even with his criticisms, Mueller considered our current war on terror “generally going rather well.” Yet he urged the audience to show more skepticism about the waste and harms of the counter-terrorism industry. Left unchecked these policies will, according to Mueller, “do the terrorists’ dirty work for them.”

Getting it Right: Slate’s Phony Farewell to Jeane Kirkpatrick

Slate still offers this farewell to Jeane Kirkpatrick, former US Ambassador to the United Nations and renowned political scientist.

Unfortunately trying to fit this neo-conservative into thoughts on Iraq, Timothy Noah gives only hallow credit to Jeane and proves little of his own.

The article’s main point is to show Jeane as a different type of neo-conservative, one highly aware of the limitations of American power.

To support this claim Noah constructs a citation machination–he didn’t get me–and cites James Mann’s observation in Rise of the Vulcans (emphasis added):

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the neoconservative movement had come to espouse ideas directly contrary to those in “Dictatorships and Double Standards.” Whereas Kirkpatrick had ridiculed the notion that it is possible to establish democracy “anytime, anywhere, under any circumstances,” during the George W. Bush administration neoconservatives argued that the United States should seek democratic reforms wherever possible, from Saudi Arabia and Egypt to Pakistan and Uzbekistan. Kirkpatrick had suggested that democratizing third world countries might take decades or centuries, but by 2002 neoconservatives were seeking democratic change among the Palestinians and in Iraq within no more than a couple of years.

Unfortunately Noah witty portrait fails in two dramatic respects. First, he fails to discuss her role as pro-Iraq pundit in the run-up to war. Second, and even more embarrassing, he fails to tease out a central lesson of Mann’s book. Neo-con lites, whether Kirkpatrick or Colin Powell, bought into the same world view as the neo-con heavies—doing nothing to stop the runaway train into Iraq.

For my evidence, I cite this 2002 interview from the Newshour with Jim Lehr discussing Powell’s now-infamous presentation to the United Nations:

GWEN IFILL: You don’t think Secretary Powell is out of step at all, do you agree with that?

JEANE KIRKPATRICK: I don’t think Secretary Powell is out of step. Secretary Powell has spent his life in uniform, and he’s a very disciplined military man and leader and I think he is a very… has a very important leadership role in the administration actually and with regard to foreign policy in the administration. I think he deserves a lot of the credit for the resolution. I also think by the way Prime Minister Tony Blair probably deserves some credit for that too.

JEANE KIRKPATRICK: It has important implications for non-proliferation too and our efforts at non-proliferation and nuclear weapons and nuclear technology because there has been such a effort with regard to Iraq. And if we fail in Iraq, there is little reason to think we’re ever going to succeed any place or in any country like North Korea for example.

Also, from the New York Times:

Fifteen years later, in March 2003, President Bush recalled Ambassador Kirkpatrick to active duty and sent her to Geneva, said Alan Gerson, who had served as her general counsel at the United Nations. The secret mission, previously undisclosed, was to head off a diplomatic uprising against the imminent war against Iraq. Arab ministers wanted to condemn it as an act of aggression.

“The marching orders we received were to argue that pre-emptive war is legitimate,” Mr. Gerson said. “She said: ‘No one will buy it. If that’s the position, count me out.’ ”

Instead, she argued that the attack was justified by Saddam Hussein’s violations of United Nations resolutions dating from the 1991 war against Iraq. The foreign ministers found her position convincing and their resolve against the war faded, Mr. Gerson said.

Here one finds Kirkpatrick favoring the country-specific and force-heavy approach to the world. As such, when it came to crunch time these voices (such as Powell and Kirkpatrick) came out in favor of the Iraq War.

Now I don’t say this to sully Kirkpatrick: one could argue the neo-con world view was not fundamentally flawed, but poorly articulated by the George W. Bush administration.Questions of this sort will fill history books and numerous best sellers for years to come.

But on the simple matter of where Kirkpatrick fell on the ideological spectrum is clear: she was a neo-con. Furthermore, she bought into the Bush campaign to go into Iraq when he did.

Noah’s attempt to sugar-coat her professed world-view is not only superficial, but insulting to Kirkpatrick’s legacy.